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NOTES
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM, CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE, AND CONTRIBUTION: AN OLD
PROBLEM AND A NEW SOLUTION
The marital relationship is a familial interest which has received judicial
recognition and protection.' The usual remedy for the tortious impairment of
this relationship is an action for loss of consortium.' A cause of action for loss of
consortium typically arises in situations where one spouse has been injured
negligently by a third party' and the other spouse brings a claim against the
third party to recover damages for any ensuing loss of consortium.* The courts,
however, are not in agreement over which elements of the loss appropriately
may be considered in a loss of consortium action. Some courts limit the
elements of the claim to various intangible or "sentimental" loss items such as
love, companionship, affection, sexual enjoyment, the prospects of parent-
hood, cooperation, and aid. 5 In contrast, other courts expand this definition of
' See Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 48, 101 N.W.2d 227, 234 (1960) (relief is
extended to one spouse where the other is wrongfully injured because society has an interest in
the protection of the family as the social unit upon which American society rests); Whittlesey v.
Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Text. 1978) ("the marital relationship is the primary familial inter-
est recognized by the courts"). See infra note 2 and accompanying text.
Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1978). Historically, actions for loss
of consortium arose from the early master/servant common law. Montgomery v. Stephan, 359
Mich. 33, 39, 101 N.W.2d 227, 230 (1960). The husband and wife were seen as one entity, and
the husband was entitled to the services of the wife. Id. Under this common law view, the hus-
band was entitled to recover for loss of his wife's services when she was injured by another's tor-
tious conduct. See id. The wife, on the other hand, did not have a right to the husband's services
under the common law and could not maintain an action for loss of services or for the other
elements of consortium such as society, intercourse and affection. Id. at 40-41, 101 N.W.2d at
230. This doctrine prevailed until 1950 when the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia held that the wife could recover for her loss of consortium resulting from negligent
injury to her husband. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 852 (1950). Today, the prevailing view is that both the husband and the wife have the right
to bring an action for loss of consortium. See American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S.
274, 284-85 & n.11 (1980) (listing forty-one states and the District of Columbia allowing recovery
for loss of consortium by a wife or a couple).
3 See Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 167-68, 302 N.E.2d 555, 564 (1973) (A
claim for loss of consortium arises "from personal injury of the other spouse caused by negligence
of a third person. . . "); Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. 1978). See, e.g.,
Macon v. Seaward Constr. Co., Inc., 555 F.2d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 1977); Nelson v. Busby, 246 Ark.
247, 248, 437 S.W.2d 799, 800 (1969). A loss of consortium claim can arise from an intentional
tort as well. See Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Ca1.3d 382, 408, 525 P.2d 669, 686, 115
Cal. Rptr. 765, 782 (1974) (either spouse has a cause of action for loss of consortium caused by a
negligent or intentional injury to the other spouse by a third party).
See, e.g., Nelson v. Busby, 246 Ark. 247, 248, 437 S.W.2d 799, 800 (1969); Lantis v.
Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 157, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24 (1979); Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d
672, , 672 (Iowa 1980); Feltch v. General Rental Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189, 1190, 421
N.E.2d 67, 69.
5 See, e.g., Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 675 (Iowa 1980); Feltch v. General
Rental Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189, 1195, 421 N.E.2d 67, 72 (1981); Whittlesey v. Miller,
572 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1978).
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consortium to include the more tangible element of loss of services.° Typically,
these services include assisting with the operation and maintenance of the fam-
ily home' as well as providing counseling and advice.° Yet, regardless of which
definition is adopted, the essential claim is the same. The spouse bringing an
action for loss of consortium (the "consortium spouse") is seeking to recover
for a loss he 9 or she suffered as a result of personal injuries sustained directly by
the other spouse (the "injured spouse").
Although most jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for loss of consorti-
urn,'° a problem arises when the injured spouse's own negligence contributes
to his injuries. The question then becomes what effect, if any, the contributory
negligence" of the injured spouse has, or should have, upon the cause of action
or recovery of the consortium spouse. The effect of the injured spouse's con-
tributory negligence on the consortium spouse's claim depends upon whether
the jurisdiction views the cause of action for loss of consortium as an independ-
ent claim or as a claim dependent upon the injured spouse's right to recover for
his own personal injuries." Viewing loss of consortium as an independent
claim assumes that the claim exists separately from the injured spouse's ability
to recover damages." Under this view, the consortium spouse's recovery of
damages would be unaffected by the injured spouse's negligence." In contrast,
viewing a consortium claim as a derivative, or otherwise dependent, cause of
action assumes that the consortium claim is integrally related to the injured
spouse's ability to recover damages. 15 In jurisdictions adopting this dependent
approach, the consortium spouse's recovery of damages would be barred or
6 See, e,g., Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 852 (1950); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 36, 101 N.W.2d 227, 228 (1960).
See Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Ca1.3d 382, 409 n.31, 525 P.2d 669, 687
n,31, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 783 n.31 (1974).
8 See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
For the sake of uniformity, "he," "his," and "him" will be used throughout this .
note to refer to both male and female spouses unless otherwise specified or indicated by the con-
text.
'° See supra note 2.
" Contributory negligence is conduct by the plaintiff that falls below the standard to
which he is required to conform for his own protection and that contributes as a legal cause to the
plaintiff's harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 463 (1965); W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 5 65, at 416-17 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. The
traditional view is that a plaintiff's contributory negligence is a complete defense for the other
party, even if the other party has been negligent as well. See Gulf, M. & 0. R.R. Co. v. Freund,
183 F.2d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 904 (1950). This effect of the plaintiff's own
negligence which bars him from maintaining his action and recovering damages has been termed
the contributory negligence doctrine. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 809-10, 532 P.2d
1226, 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 862 (1975); Kirby v, Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 613-15, 256
N.W.2d 400, 413-14 (1977).
12 See infra notes 26-47 and accompanying text. See generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 469
(1968 & Supp. 1982).
" See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g. , Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 157-60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24-26
(1979); Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 673 (Iowa 1980); Feltch v. General Rental Co., 1981
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189, 1192-95, 421 N.E.2d 67, 70-72 (1981).
" See infra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
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limited by the injured spouse's negligence." Moreover, in jurisdictions limit-
ing or barring the consortium spouse's recovery of damages according to the
injured spouse's negligence, the effect of such negligence on the consortium
spouse's recovery of damages may vary depending on whether the jurisdiction
adheres to a contributory or a comparative negligence doctrine." In con-
tributory negligence jurisdictions, the contributory negligence of the injured
spouse generally bars recovery of damages by the consortium spouse." Simi-
16 See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. Courts appear to express two differing
views as to the effect of the injured spouse's contributory negligence. Some courts indicate that
the contributory negligence of the injured spouse bars or limits the maintenance of a cause of action
by the consortium spouse, thereby barring or limiting the consortium spouse's recovery of dam-
ages. See, e.g. , Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 432, 397 P.2d 529, 530 (1964) (contributory negli-
gence doctrine; contributory negligence of injured spouse bars consortium spouse's cause of ac-
tion for loss of consortium); Abbate v. Big V Supermkts., Inc., 95 Misc.2d 483, 485, 407
N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (comparative negligence doctrine; consortium spouse's
action abated to same extent that negligent injured spouse's right to recover is diminished).
Other courts, however, refer to the injured spouse's contributory negligence as limiting or bar-
ring the consortium spouse's recovery of .damages; there is no emphasis on limiting or barring the
underlying cause of action as such. See, e.g. , Pioneer Constr. Co. v. Bergeron, 170 Cob. 474,
478, 462 P.2d 589, 591 (1969) (contributory negligence doctrine; contributory negligence of in-
jured spouse bars recovery of damages for loss of consortium); White v. Lunder, 66 Wis.2d 563,
574, 225 N.W.2d 442, 449 (1975) (comparative negligence doctrine; negligence of injured spouse
bars or limits recovery of consortium spouse). This apparent distinction might be only the result
of the courts' use of different terminology to express the same notion. Under either view the prac-
tical result is that the consortium spouse's recovery of damages is limited or barred according to
the injured spouse's contributory negligence. Insofar as any actual distinction exists between the
two views, this note uses phrases such as "limits or bars recovery of damages" to cover both ap-
proaches.
17 Under the contributory negligence doctrine, the plaintiff's own negligent conduct
bars his recovery completely. PROSSER, supra note 11, S 65, at 417. The comparative negligence
doctrine, however, is based on the principle that liability for damages should be borne by those
individuals whose negligence caused the harm in direct proportion to their respective fault. Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Ca1.3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975). In
Li, the California Supreme Court noted that "fault," as used here, means nothing more than
negligence in the accepted legal sense. Id., at 813 n.6a, 532 P.2d at 1232 n.6a, 119 Cal. Rptr. at
864 n.6a. In a "pure" comparative negligence system, the recovery of the plaintiff is diminished
in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to him. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13
Ca1.3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975) (adopting "pure" form of
comparative negligence by judicial decision); R.I. GEN. LAWS 5 9-20-4 (Supp. 1981). In such a
system, the plaintiff would be barred from recovery only if he were one hundred percent negli-
gent. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Ca1.3d 804, 827-28, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242-43, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 874-75 (1975). Under "fifty percent" comparative negligence systems, the plaintiff's recov-
ery likewise must be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to him.
See PROSSER, supra note 11, 67, at 436-37. Once the proportion of the plaintiff's negligence with
respect to the defendant's negligence reaches an established "cutoff" point, however, the plain-
tiff's recovery is barred. See id. In some states thi's point is reached when the plaintiff's negligence
is as great as the defendant's. See, e.g., COL. REV. STAT. S 13-21-111(1) (1973). In other states
this point is not reached until the plaintiff's negligence is greater than the defendant's. See, e.g. ,
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 507:7-a (Supp. 1969).
18 See Pioneer Constr. Co. v. Bergeron, 170 Cob. 474, 478, 462 P.2d 589, 591 (1969);
McKee v. Neilson, 444 P.2d 194, 198 (Okla. 1968); Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 432, 397
P.2d 529, 530 (1964). But see Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 1980). See supra note
16.
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lady, in comparative negligence jurisdictions, the recovery of damages by the
consortium spouse would be limited or barred to the same extent that the
recovery of damages by the injured spouse would be limited or barred in that
spouse's action.' 9
This note submits that the cause of action for loss of consortium should be
considered independent of the injured spouse's cause of action or right to
recover damages. As a result, the consortium spouse should be granted full
recovery of damages despite the injured spouse's negligence. The note begins
by examining the rationales propounded in support of the view that the consor-
tium spouse's recovery of damages under a cause of action for loss of consorti-
um should be limited or barred by the injured spouse's negligence. Next, the
view that the consortium spouse's recovery of damages under a cause of action
for loss of consortium should not be limited or barred by the injured spouse's
negligence will be discussed. The note then examines loss of consortium as an
independent cause of action. The loss of consortium action will be analyzed,
and the rationales advanced in support of the view that the consortium spouse's
recovery of damages should be limited or barred by the injured spouse's
negligence will be evaluated. This note suggests that these rationales fail to
assess accurately the nature of consortium claims. Subsequently, the note pro-
poses that permitting contribution among joint tortfeasors in a consortium ac-
tion, including the negligent injured spouse, largely eliminates concerns over
fairness raised by granting the consortium spouse full recovery. Moreover, the
way in which contribution is consistent with viewing loss of consortium as an
independent cause of action will be demonstrated. Finally, after examining in-
terspousal immunity in the context of loss of consortium actions, this note
urges abrogation of interspousal immunity in relation to loss of consortium ac-
tions, at least to the extent that the doctrine prevents contribution in such ac-
tions, in jurisdictions retaining the doctrine in this setting.
I. CONSORTIUM SPOUSE'S RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR Loss OF
CONSORTIUM AFFECTED BY NEGLIGENCE OF INJURED SPOUSE
Courts traditionally have held that the consortium spouse's recovery of
damages under a cause of action for loss of consortium" is limited or barred by
the contributory negligence of the injured spouse." Various theories and ra-
I° See, e.g., Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Alaska 1979); Ferguson v. Ben
M. Hogan Co., 307 F. Supp. 658, 665 (W.D. Ark. 1969); Hamm v. City of Milton, 358 So.2d
121, 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Abbate v. Big V Supermkts., Inc., 95 Misc.2d 483, 485, 407
N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); White v. Lunder, 66 Wis.2d 563, 574-76, 225 N.W.2d
442, 449 (1975). See supra note 16.
2° A loss of consortium action is an action brought by one spouse against a negligent
third party for loss of the other spouse's society, affection, services, and related items resulting
when the latter spouse has sustained personal injuries negligently caused by the third party. See
supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
2 ' See Pioneer Constr. Co. v. Bergeron, 170 Colo. 474, 478, 462 P.2d 589, 591 (1969);
Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 432, 397 P.2d 529, 530 (1964); see, e.g., Eggert v. Working, 599
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tionales have been propounded in support of this traditional rule. 22 Two such
rationales in particular are offered by modern courts as justifications for sup-
port of this rule. One of these rationales, the derivative theory, suggests that
the consortium claim is integrally related to and dependent upon the injured
spouse's ability to recover damages." This rationale focuses on the conceptual
basis of the consortium claim. The other rationale, the fairness theory, is
founded upon more practical considerations. The fairness theory suggests that
the consortium spouse's recovery should be limited because of equitable con-
cerns. 24 While these two rationales stem from somewhat different bases, both
rationales support the notion that the negligence of the injured spouse should
limit or bar the consortium spouse's recovery of damages under a cause of ac-
tion for loss of consortium. 25
A. The Derivative Theory
Perhaps the most frequently advanced basis for holding that an injured
spouse's contributory negligence bars or limits recovery of damages for loss of
consortium by the other spouse is that the consortium action is derivative."
Derivative is essentially a general, undefined term which indicates that the con-
sortium claim flows from the injured spouse's cause of action." Under this ra-
P.2d 1369, 1391 (Alaska 1979); Hamm v. City of Milton, 358 So.2d 121, 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489, 496, 65 N.W.2d 917, 922 (1954); Abbate v. Big V
Supermkts., Inc., 95 Misc.2d 483, 485, 407 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); McKee v.
Neilson, 444 P.2d 194, 198 (Okla. 1968); White v. Lunder, 66 Wis.2d 563, 575-76, 225 N.W.2d
442, 449 (1975).
But see, e.g., Macon v. Seaward Constr. Co., Inc., 555 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1977);
Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 157-58, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24-25 (1979); Fuller v.
Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 1980); Feltch v. General Rental Co., 1981 Mass. Adv, Sh.
1189, 1193.94, 421 N.E.2d 67, 70-71 (1981). See supra note 16.
22 One such theory, based upon imputed negligence, was propounded nearly a century
ago by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v.
Honey, 63 F. 39, 40-44 (8th Cir. 1894), Under this theory, where the husband assumed that the
wife was competent to control her own movements and to provide for her own safety, he was
responsible for her contributory negligence. Id. at 41. Since her contributory negligence was im-
puted to him, the husband was prevented from maintaining an action for loss of consortium. Id.
at 40-44. See infra note 123.
Another theory formulated in support of the traditional rule is based on assignment
principles, See infra note 30. Additionally, it has even been suggested that since the traditional
rule has been in existence for so long, the courts should abide by it. See infra note 33.
23 See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
25 See Rieke v. Brodof, 501 S.W.2d 66, 67 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). For cases decided
under the comparative negligence doctrine see, e.g., Nelson v. Busby, 246 Ark. 247, 254-55, 437
S.W.2d 799, 803 (1969); Hamm v. City of Milton, 358 So.2d 121,. 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978); Abbate v. Big V Supermkts., Inc., 95 Misc.2d 483, 485, 407 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1978); White v. Lunder, 66 Wis.2d 563, 574, 225 N.W.2d 442, 449 (1975). For cases
decided under the contributory negligence doctrine see, e.g., Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489,
496, 65 N.W.2d 917, 922 (1954); Huff v. Trowbridge, 439 S.i.V.2d 493, 498 (Mo. 1969).
27 See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
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tionale, the consortium spouse's right to recover damages for loss of consorti-'
urn is related directly to the right of the injured spouse to recover damages for
his own personal injury." Accordingly, if the wife, as the injured spouse, could
not recover in her action for personal injuries because she was contributorily
negligent, then the husband could not recover damages in his action for loss of
consortium against the same defendant." Essentially, in situations where the
injured spouse is contributorily negligent, the consortium spouse's recovery of
damages would be limited or barred to the extent that the injured ,spouse's
recovery of damages would be limited or barred."
B. The Fairness Theory
At least one court has suggested a less technical reason for deciding that
the contributory negligence of the injured spouse should limit or bar the con-
sortium spouse's recovery of damages for loss of consortium. This rationale
might best be viewed as a fairness argument. In Ross v. Cuthbert, 3 ' the Oregon
Supreme Court indicated that it may not be fair for a third party tortfeasor to
pay all of the damages in a loss of consortium action when the injured spouse's
negligence made that spouse responsible for some of those damages." The
court acknowledged that perhaps it is not fair to allow a family to "team up"
against a third party and allow the consortium spouse to recover in the consor-
tium spouse's name when the negligent injured spouse could not have recov-
ered." Also, where the consortium action is viewed as simply an "academic
" See, e.g., Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1390-91 (Alaska 1979); Nelson v.
Busby, 246 Ark. 247, 254-55, 437 S.W.2d 799, 803 (1969); Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489, 496,
65 N.W.2d 917, 922 (1954).
29 See Augenblick v. Augenblick, 203 Misc. 360, 362, 117 N.Y.S.2d 69, 71 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1952).
" See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. Another theory, which is related to the
derivative theory, suggests that the consortium action is governed by assignment principles. Se
Stuart v, Winnie, 217 Wis. 298, 305-06, 258 N.W. 511, 613-14 (1935). Under this assignment
theory, there is only one cause of action, and this action belongs to the injur ed spouse. Id. As a
result of the marital relation and its attendant rights and obligations, that part of the injured
spouse's cause of action which is for loss of services to the consortium spouse is assigned to the
consortium spouse by operation of law. Id., 258 N.W. at 614. The assigned portion of the injured
spouse's cause of action, being derived from that spouse, continues in the consortium spouse sub-
ject to any defenses that existed against the injured spouse. Id. at 305, 258 N.W. at 614. The
underlying principle is that "the assignee of a cause of action stands in the shoes of the assignor."
Id. at 305-06, 258 N.W. at 614. See infra note 123.
3 ' 239 Or. 429, 397 P.2d 529 (1964).
32 Id. at 435, 397 P.2d at 531. Essentially, this concern is predicated upon the "all or
nothing" results produced under the contributory negligence doctrine. Id. To the extent that the
consortium action arises in a comparative negligence jurisdiction, however, this concern loses
much of its substance.
" Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 435, 397 P.2d 529, 531-32 (1964). In holding that the
negligence of the injured spouse barred the maintenance of an action for loss of consortium by the
other spouse, the Ross court stated: "Having been settled, and since we find in ourselves no
disposition to change it, we abide by the settled rule." Id. at 435-36, 397 P.2d at 532. Courts ap-
plying this line of reasoning often discuss all or most of the other arguments offered in support of
the rule, but invariably state the rule without enunciating which rationale is the correct or pre-
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addendum,"• and where the husband and wife are seen as an "economic
unit,"" this fairness concern encompasses the notion that a "double
recovery" should not be allowed. For example, in a comparative negligence
jurisdiction the injured spouse may be able to recover damages, but the
damages must be reduced by the amount of his fault." Allowing the consor-
tium spouse full recovery under these circumstances might be deemed to be an
additional indirect recovery by the negligent injured spouse. Since, under this
view, the consortium recovery would be seen as simply additional compensa-
tion for the same injury, the consortium award may appear inequitable from
the third party's standpoint."
Under both the derivative and fairness theories, the consortium spouse's
recovery of damages for loss of consortium is limited or barred not by the
negligence of the consortium spouse, but rather, by the negligence of the in-
jured spouse. By limiting or barring the consortium spouse's recovery of dam-
ages because of the injured spouse's negligence, these theories make the con-
sortium spouse's recovery of damages dependent upon the legal effect of the in-
jured spouse's actions. Both the derivative and fairness theories tend to equate
the position of the consortium 'spouse in his action against a third party with
that of the injured spouse in his action against the third party. Under both
theories, therefore, the consortium spouse's right to recover damages for loss of
consortium is dependent upon the injured spouse's right to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained by him. In this sense loss of consortium is not
regarded as an independent cause of action.
II. CONSORTIUM SPOUSE'S RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR Loss OF
CONSORTIUM NOT AFFECTED BY NEGLIGENCE OF INJURED SPOUSE
Although in actions for loss of consortium the negligence of the injured
spouse traditionally has been held to bar or limit recovery of damages by the
ferred one. See, e.g. , Pioneer Constr. Co. v. Bergeron, 170 Colo. 474, 478-83, 462 P.2d 589,
591-94 (1964); McKee v. Neilson, 444 P.2d 194, 197-198 (Okla. 1968). This position is also
taken by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 494 (1965). The RESTATEMENT states as a
rule that "[T]he plaintiff is barred from recovery for an invasion of his legally protected interest
in the health or life of a third person which results from the harm or death of such third person, if
the negligence of such third person would have barred his own recovery." Id. Comment c adds
that the negligence of the third person bars the plaintiff's recovery only to the extent that it would
do so if it were his own. Id. at Comment c. In essence, the courts have followed this precedent for
such a long time that it has gained the status of a justification in itself. See infra note 139.
34 See Belli with Wilkinson, Loss of Consortium: Academic Addendum or Substantial Right?, 16
TRIAL 20, 20 (Feb. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Belli].
" See Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Alaska 1979) (the husband and wife are
in effect, if not in law, an "economic unit").
36 See supra note 17.
33 This view presupposes that there is only one injury to both spouses. Under the view
of the consortium action as independent, however, there are two distinct plaintiffs, the injured
spouse and the consortium spouse, who each suffer a direct harm. See supra notes 40-47 and ac-
companying text.
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consortium spouse," some courts recently have repudiated this rule. 39 These
courts have held that the negligence of the injured spouse should not affect the
recovery of the consortium spouse." The central reason courts offer for this
result is that the action for loss of consortium is independent of the personal in-
jury action of the injured spouse.'" Under this view, the spouse suing for loss of
consortium is enforcing an independent right, even though the claim is based
on the same set of facts as the other spouse's action for personal injuries. 4" In
other words, the nature of the respective claims should be analyzed, not the
source of the injuries.'" The view of the consortium claim as independent sug-
gests that the loss of consortium action never belonged to the injured spouse,
just as the suit for personal injuries never belonged to the consortium spouse."
While the cause of action for loss of consortium "arises" from the injuries of
the injured spouse, the harm suffered by the consortium spouse is personal to
that spouse. 45
 Loss of the injured spouse's consortium impairs "wholly sepa-
rate and distinct" interests of the other spouse, such as the morally and legally
sanctioned privilege of copulation or procreation." In effect, the consortium
spouse is being deprived of the full enjoyment of the marital relationship.'"
III. Loss OF CONSORTIUM AS AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION
Under the view that loss of consortium is an independent cause of action,
the consortium claim is seen as existing separately and distinctly from the in-
jured spouse's claim for personal injuries." Accordingly, under this view the
injured spouse's negligence has no effect on the consortium spouse's recovery
of damages.'" In the loss of consortium context, the loss of consortium action
3' See supra notes 15-19 and 27-37 and accompanying text.
39
 See, e.g. , Macon v. Seaward Constr. Co., Inc., 555 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1977); Lantis
v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 157-58, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24-25 (1979); Fuller v. Buhrow, 292
N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 1980); Feltch v. •General Rental Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189,
3193-94, 421 N.E.2d 67, 70-71 (1981).
The traditional rule that the injured spouse's negligence bars or limits the consor-
tium spouse's cause of action or recovery of damages thereunder has been condemned by various
legal scholars. PROSSER, supra note 11, S 125, at 893; see, e.g., Gregory, The Contributory Negligence
of Plaintiff's Wife or Child in an Action for Loss of Services, Etc., 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 173, 173-93 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as Gregory]; James, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 LA. L. REV. 340, 354-56
(1954).
4° See supra note 39.
4' Macon v. Seaward Constr. Co., Inc., 555 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1977); Lantis v. Con-
don, 95 Cal. , App.3d 152, 157-58, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24-25 (1979); Fuller v. Buhrow, 292
N.W.2d 672, 675 (Iowa 1980); Feltch v. General Rental Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189,
1193-94, 421 N.E.2d 67, 70-71 (1981).
42 Feltch v. General Rental Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189, 1193, 421 N.E.2d 67, 71
(1981).
43 Id. at 1194, 421 N.E.2d at 71.
44 Id.
43
 Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 157, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24 (1979).
46 Id.
" Id.
49 See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
19 See supra notes 14 and 40-47 and accompanying text.
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exists between the consortium spouse and the negligent third party, not be-
tween the injured spouse and the negligent third party, Since under an inde-
pendent cause of action theory the consortium spouse's claim for loss of consor-
tium exists independently of the injured spouse's action, the negligence of the
injured spouse has no bearing of legal significance on an action by the consor-
tium spouse against the third party causing the loss of consortium.
This note submits that the independent cause of action approach to loss of
consortium actions is the more logically sound and equitable approach to such
actions. This conclusion is based upon three major reasons. First, the loss of
consortium action, arguably, meets all the requirements of a separate, inde-
pendent negligence action. The independent cause of action treatment given to
loss of consortium claims in some specific situations evidences that such re-
quirements are met. Moreover, there are strong policy reasons for treating loss
of consortium as an independent cause of action. Second, the derivative and
fairness theories advanced in support of the view that loss of consortium is not
an independent action fail to assess accurately the nature of the consortium
claim. Finally, any unfairness to the parties involved in a consortium suit can
be remedied by allowing contribution from the negligent injured spouse.
A. Analysis of Loss of Consortium Actions
1. Loss of Consortium and the Elements of a Negligence Action
The independent nature of the consortium claim is demonstrated best by
examining the consortium claim in the framework of a negligence action. A
cause of action for negligence, essentially, is comprised of four elements. First,
the defendant must be under a duty or obligation, recognized by law, to con-
form to a certain standard of conduct in order to protect others against unrea-
sonable risks. 5° To conform to this standard of conduct, the defendant must do
what a reasonable person would do under the same or similar circumstances.'"
Closely related to this duty of reasonableness is the concept of foreseeability. 52
A person's duty is determined largely by the foreseeable risk to other persons or
property created by his negligent conduct." Second, the defendant must
breach this duty by failing to conform to the required standard of reasonable
care." Third, a reasonably close causal connection must exist between the
defendant's conduct and the resulting injury." Finally, actual loss or damage
to the interests of the plaintiff must result." Arguably, each of these elements
of a negligence action exists in a cause of action for loss of consortium.
5° PROSSER, supra note 11, 30, at 143.
51 Id. 5 32, at 151.
52
 Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 651, 406 A.2d 300, 303 (1979).
53 Set 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, $ 18.2, at 1018 (1956) [herein-
after cited as HARPER & JAMES],
54
 PROSSER, supra note 11, 30, at 143.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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It is foreseeable that a person is married, especially since this is a common
status among adults in society. 57 It is foreseeable also that physical injuries suf-
fered by one spouse will result in a certain amount of deprivation and suffering
by the other spouse. 58 The consortium spouse thus can be seen as a distinct and
separate plaintiff. Indeed, from the standpoint of the defendant, the con-
sortium spouse is simply a "foreseeable plaintiff' to whom the defendant owes
a separate duty of care." If, for example, the injury suffered by the wife were a
broken leg while riding in a vehicle struck by a negligent third party and driven
by her contributorily negligent husband, it is unlikely that the husband's
negligence would preclude the wife from obtaining full recovery from the third
party. 6° Following this separate plaintiff reasoning, there appears to be no valid
reason why injury to- a spouse's psychological and emotional state, or to his
privilege to engage in sexual activities with the other spouse, should be treated
differently than injury to the spouse's physical well-being.". The third party
owes a duty to the consortium spouse to exercise reasonable care to prevent an
unreasonable risk of harm to the consortium spouse.
The loss of consortium action, arguably, meets the other requirements of a
separate negligence action as well. There is a breach of this duty where the
third party fails to exercise reasonable care, thereby causing injuries to the in-
jured spouse. Furthermore, there is a reasonably close causal connection be-
tween the third party's conduct and the consortium spouse's loss. The consorti-
um spouse's loss would not exist but for the conduct of the third party. Also,
the harm to the consortium spouse is both foreseeable and directly related to
the failure of the third party to conform to the standard of care required by
him. Finally, the consortium spouse suffers actual loss and damage as a result
of the third party's conduct.
The separate and personal nature of the consortium spouse's loss, as an
element of an independent negligence action, is illustrated by Rodriguez v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.," a California Supreme Court case involving a wife's claim
" Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal.3d 382, 400, 525 P.2d 669, 680, 115
Cal. Rptr. 765, 776 (1974) ("One who negligently causes a severely disabling injury to an adult
may reasonably expect that the injured person is married. . . In our society the likelihood that
an injured adult will be a married man or woman is substantial. . . .").
" Id. In Rodriguez, the California Supreme Court stated that "one who negligently
causes a severely disabling injury to an adult may reasonably expect that the injured person is
married and that his or her spouse will be adversely affected by that injury." Id. The court fur-
ther stated that "in our society the likelihood that an injured adult will be a married man or
woman is substantial, . [a]nd the probability that the spouse of a severely disabled person
will suffer a personal loss by reason of that injury is equally substantial." Id. See also Dziokonski
v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 567, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (1978) (action for negligent infliction
of severe emotional distress; it is reasonably foreseeable that, if one negligently operates a
motor vehicle so as to injure a person, there will be one or more persons sufficiently attached
emotionally to the injured person that he or they will be affected").
6° Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 157, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24 (1979).
6° Id.
61 Id. As the Lantis court stated, "[t]he law protects equally [the consortium spouse's]
sex life and . . . leg." Id. at 158, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
62 12 Cal.3d 382, 525 P.2d 669,• 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
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for loss of consortium resulting from injuries to her husband.° In Rodriguez, a
husband and wife had been married for a short time when the husband was in-
jured in an accident." A blow to his head caused severe spinal cord damage,
leaving him paralyzed below the midpoint of his chest and partially paralyzed
in one of his arms.° The husband became an invalid and was bedridden a
great deal of the time. 66 The husband suffered from pain, mental anguish, and
frustration, and lost all capacity for sexual intercourse and reproduction. 67 The
wife gave up her job to care for him on a twenty-four hour basis." In light of
these circumstances, the Supreme Court of California held that the wife had a
cause of action for loss of consortium.°
In reaching its holding, the Rodriguez court emphasized that the wife had
suffered a real and distinct loss. 70 The court indicated that since the husband
may well need all the emotional strength he has just to survive the shock of his
injury, the wife will not receive the comfort and moral support from him which
she would otherwise experience." Rather, the court noted, the wife might have ,
to give him increased attention and solace." The court recognized that the wife
could no longer enjoy her legally and morally proper privilege of copulation
and procreation." The Rodriguez court explained that the wife was "for all
practical purposes, sterilized. . . " 74 Additionally, the court noted that the
wife was deprived of her full enjoyment of the marital state." Furthermore,
aside from the wife's romantic and sexual activities, the court recognized that
her social and recreational life was severely restricted. 76
Under such circumstances, the wife, the consortium spouse, has indeed
suffered a very real and personal loss. While the loss suffered by the consortium
spouse might be the most visible element of the negligence action, the consorti-
um claim arguably satisfies the other requirements for a distinct, independent
negligence action as well. Moreover, the nature of the consortium claim as an
independent negligence action is supported by the independent treatment ac-
corded the consortium action in certain contexts.
63 Id. at 385-86, 525 P.2d at 670-71, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 766-67.
64 Id. at 385, 525 P.2d at 670, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
65 Id. at 385-86, 525 P.2d at 670, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
66 Id. at 386, 525 P.2d at 670, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
67 Id., 525 P.2d at.671, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
6" Id., 525 P.2d at 670, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
60 Id. at 408-09, 525 P.2d at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
70 Id. at 385-86 and 399-406, 525 P.2d at 670-71 and 679-134, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 766-67
and 775-80.
See id. at 405-06, 525 P.2d at 684, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
72 See id. at 405, 525 P.2d at 684, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
73 Id., 525 P.2d at 684, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 780. This loss of the privilege to have sexual
intercourse and to produce children assumes that the wife chooses to remain married and faithful
to her husband.
7* Id. at 386, 525 P.2d at 671, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
75 Id. at 405, 525 P.2d at 684, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 780,
76 Id. at 386, 525 P.2d at 671, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
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2. Specific Situations
The independent nature of the consortium action is supported also by the
independent treatment loss of consortium claims have received in some specific
situations. For instance, some courts have determined that a spouse suing for
loss of consortium is entitled to a separate trial before a separate jury." It is
thus possible for different results to occur in the injured spouse's action for neg-
ligence and the consortium spouse's action for loss of consortium. The jury in
the injured spouse's trial may find that the injured spouse was contributorily
negligent and thus reduce or bar that spouse's recovery. In contrast, the jury in
the consortium spouse's case may find that the injured spouse was not
negligent and subsequently grant the consortium spouse full recovery. 78 This
latter result may not occur in a jurisdiction which holds that the determination
of the injured spouse's negligence in his suit has an issue preclusion effect in the
consortium spouse's action." Some courts have held, however, that the finding
of contributory negligence in the injured spouse's suit is not conclusive on the
negligence issue in the consortium spouse's action." Moreover, at least one
court has indicated that the bar of the injured spouse's claim by the statute of
nonclaim81 does not prevent the tolling of the statute as to the consortium
spouse's damages. 82
3. Policy Considerations
Along with these considerations of the nature of the consortium action,
and the independent treatment given to it in certain situations, there are strong
policy reasons for treating loss of consortium as an independent cause of action.
Although marriage creates certain rights and obligations between spouses, it
does not destroy the separate legal identities of the spouses." Likewise, the
marital relationship does not negate the reality that each spouse exists and
functions as an individual in fact." Persons who choose to live in this matri-
monial state are theoretically limiting satisfaction of their individual romantic,
sexual, and procreation desires and needs to their marriage partners. There-
77 See, e.g., Lopez v. Waldrum Estate, 249 Ark. 558, 564-65, 460 S.W.2d 61, 65 (1970)
(mere fact that husband's cause of action is derivative does not mean that the actions cannot be
prosecuted independently); Blanken v. Braslow, 130 N.J.L. 475, 476-77, 33 A.2d 742, 742-43
(1943) (husband suing for loss of consortium sues in his own right; husband and wife could have
brought separate suits). But see Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Alaska 1979).
78 See Gregory, supra note 39, at 186.
78 See Sisemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574, 575-77, 367 S.W.2d 417, 418-19 (1963).
88 See, e.g., Lansburgh & Bro., Inc. v. Clark, 127 F.2d 331, 332-33 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
Feltch v. General Rental Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189, 1193, 421 N.E.2d 67, 71 (1981);
Elmore v. Illinois Terminal R.R. Co., 301 S.W.2d 44, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
°I A statute of nonclaim is essentially a statute of limitations. See BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 948 (5th ed. 1979).
82 See Lopez v. Waldrum Estate, 249 Ark. 558, 564, 460 S.W.2d 61, 65 (1970).
" See Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 49 101 N.W.2d 227, 235 (1960);
PROSSER, supra note 11, 5 74, at 490 and S 122 at 861.
64 See supra note 83.
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fore, when one of the spouses is injured to the extent that he is unable to satisfy
these desires and needs of the other spouse, the latter has suffered an actual,
personal deprivation. In effect, denying the consortium spouse recovery of
damages in such a situation penalizes that spouse for being faithful to the in-
jured spouse and for maintaining the marital relationship.
The marital relationship is the foundation of the family unit, and the fami-
ly has been recognized by the courts as the social unit upon which society
rests." Maintenance and protection of the family unit, therefore, has been con-
sidered important for the functioning and well-being of society." Accordingly,
it does not appear to be sound policy to penalize a person who chooses to enter
into a marital relationship and to maintain that relationship faithfully, despite
severe injuries to his spouse, by denying him recovery for loss of consortium."
Rather, the preferred policy would be to encourage the maintenance of the
marital relationship and to recognize the existence of a distinct injury in such
cases by allowing the consortium spouse full recovery of damages despite the
injured spouse's contributory negligence. 88
In summary, the consortium claim arguably has all the requisites of a
separate negligence action. The consortium spouse suffers a very real, personal
loss. This loss is comprised of the physical, psychological, and emotional pain
suffered personally by the consortium spouse, resulting from injuries to the
other spouse. 89
 Analyzing a loss of consortium claim in these terms strongly
suggests that the claim is in no legally significant way dependent upon the legal
right of the injured spouse to recover for his personal injury, just as the injured
spouse's suit for injuries is not dependent on the consortium spouse's right to
recover." Moreover, the consortium claim has received independent treatment
85 See, e.g., Seidenberg v. Seidenberg, 126 F. Supp. 19, 23 (1954), aff'd 225 F.2d 545
(1955); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 48, 101 N.W.2d 227, 234 (1960); Shelley v.
Shelley, 223 Or. 328, 340-41, 354 P.2d 282, 287-88 (1960).
86 See Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 48, 101 N. W.2d 227, 234 (1960).
87
 Additionally, it is conceivable that denying the consortium spouse recovery for
damages could lead to disruption of the marital relationship and the family unit by causing
resentment and conflict between the spouses.
88
 It could be argued that the negligent third party should not have to pay additional
money in damages simply because the injured spouse happens to be married. This argument,
however, overlooks two important factors. First, it is foreseeable that the injured spouse will be
married and that injury to the injured spouse will cause his spouse to suffer a loss. See supra notes
57-59 and accompanying text. In essence, the consortium spouse is a foreseeable plaintiff to
whom the negligent third party owes a separate duty of care. See supra note 59 and accompanying
text. Second, a fundamental principle of negligence law is that one whose negligence has caused
damage to another should be liable for that damage. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, it is fundamental in the law of torts that, absent a statute or compelling public
policy reasons, a person proximately injured by the act of another should be compensated. Klein
v. Klein, 58 Ca1.2d 692, 694-95, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962). The most com-
pelling policy concern in the loss of consortium context is that which calls for the innocent consor-
tium spouse to be fully compensated. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
89
 Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 157, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24 (1979).
99 See Feltch v. General Rental Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189, 1194, 421 N.E.2d 67,
71 (1981).
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in certain contexts. Finally, strong policy considerations suggest that the con-
sortium action should be recognized as an independent claim. For these
reasons, it is submitted that loss of consortium is most appropriately viewed as
an independent cause of action which should not be affected by the injured
spouse's contributory negligence. Indeed, these reasons alone are sufficient to
justify the conclusion that loss of consortium is an independent cause of action.
The view of loss of consortium as an independent cause of action is bolstered,
however, by the failure of the derivative and fairness theories to accurately
assess the loss of consortium action and its attendant concerns.
B. Critique of the Derivative and Fairness .Theories
1. Derivative Theory
Under the derivative theory, the consortium spouse's recovery of damages
for loss of consortium is related directly to the right of the injured spouse to
recover damages for his own personal injuries. 9 ' Although appliCation of the
derivative theory limits or bars the consortium spouse's recovery according to
the injured spouse's negligence, the meaning of derivative is not entirely clear
as it is used in the consortium context. Indeed, courts typically state that the
consortium claim is derivative without then defining the meaning of de-
rivative. 92 In a narrow sense, derivative means that which does not have its
origin in itself but is taken from another." This meaning of the term derivative
is the one employed in shareholders' derivative suits and in survival actions."
In shareholders' derivative suits and in survival actions, the plaintiff has a right
to bring the action on behalf of another "person" in whom the claim origi-
nated." In its broadest sense, however, derivative also could mean integrally
related to and dependent upon the marital relationship and the injuries to the
injured spouse. In other words, the consortium action "arises" 96 from or "ac-
quires from"" the other spouse's injuries; it is "dependent" upon the right of
the injured spouse to recover damages." Regardless of which definition per-
91 See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., Nelson v. Busby, 246 Ark. 247, 255, 437 S.W.2d 799, 803(1969); Hamm v.
City of Milton, 358 So.2d 121, 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489,
496; 65 N.W.2d 917, 922 (1954); Elmore v. Illinois Terminal R.R. Co., 301 S.W.2d 44, 47
(Mo. Ct. App, 1957).
93 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 399 (5th ed. 1979).
9+ See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
98 Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 157, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24 (1979). (The
California Court of Appeals indicated, however, that the view of the consortium action as
derivative, as such, was not a sound one.) White v. Lunder, 66 Wis.2d 563, 568, 225 N.W.2d
442, 445 (1975) ("arises").
" See Gregory, supra note 39, at 183 (derivative is at least used in the sense of "acquir-
ing from").
98 See Logullo v. joannides, 301 F. Supp. 722, 726 (D. Del. 1969); Eggert v. Working,
599 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Alaska 1979).
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tains, however, a careful analysis indicates that the consortium claim is not
properly a derivative action.
The narrow meaning of derivative, as originating in one party and passing
to another, assumes that there is one claim on which two parties have a right to
sue. There are instances where a claim originates in one party, who had a right
to sue on it, and then passes to another party by operation of law or by volun-
tary transfer. 99 A prime example of such an instance is the stockholder's
derivative suit. The cause of action in this situation belongs to the corporation,
not to the shareholder who brings the suit.'" The cause of action is based upon
a primary right of the corporation, but it is asserted by the stockholder where
the corporation has failed to act upon its primary right.'" Since the right to sue
belongs to the corporation and is not a personal right of the shareholder, the
cause of action is said to be derivative.'" Likewise, survival actions can be
thought of as derivative, since the cause of action is one which belonged to the
decedent, but upon which he is unable to sue because of his death.'" The ac-
99 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 53, 23.8, at 1278.
'°° Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522 (1947).
'°' Schreiber v. Butte Copper & Zinc Co., 98 F. Supp. 106, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
102 Id. As a result of the corporate form, a loss experienced by the corporation has reper-
cussions on the shareholders comprising the corporation. In this regard, the loss is "personal" to
both the corporation and the shareholders. Nevertheless, the claim belongs to the corporation
and the action is brought on behalf of the corporation by the shareholders. See supra notes 99-106
and accompanying text. In this sense, the shareholders' claim is derivative. See supra notes 99-106
and accompanying text. In contrast, the consortium spouse's claim for loss of consortium never
belonged to the injured spouse. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. The consortium spouse,
therefore, unlike the shareholders in a derivative suit, is bringing an independent cause of action
for a claim which belongs only to that spouse; the injured spouse could not have brought a claim
for the consortium spouse's loss of consortium. See supra notes 48-82 and 90 and accompanying
text.
'°3 Survival statutes typically provide that the personal representative of the deceased
may bring an action, such as a tort action, on the deceased's behalf, for a cause of action which
the deceased had before his death. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 5 34-1-1-1 (Burns 1973); MASS.
GEN. STAT. ANN. ch . 228, 5 1 (West 1958 & Supp. 1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 556:9
(1974); S.C. CODE ANN. 5 15-5-90 (Law Co-op. 1976). See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra
note 53, 5 23.8, at 1281; PROSSER, supra note 11, 5 127, at 902, 906. Such actions usually may be
maintained, however, only where the deceased, had he lived, would have been entitled to main-
tain an action. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 5 34-1-1-1 (Burns 1973); See 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra
note 53, 5 23.8, at 1281-82; PROSSER., supra note 11, 5 127, at 910. This limitation has been inter-
preted as requiring the deceased's contributory negligence to limit the cause of action and recov-
ery of damages by the estate. See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 53, $ 23.8 at 1281 ("the
surviving action is derivative in the fullest sense of the term, and the result . . . comes as near to
being demanded by inexorable logic as anything does"); W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V.
SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, 589 (6th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ].
It also has been suggested that the consortium situation is analogous to that which ex-
ists in relation to wrongful death actions. See Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 158, 157
Cal. Rptr. 22, 25 (1979) (recognizing and rejecting the argument that the claim for loss of consor-
tium is analogous to an action by heirs for the wrongful death of their decedent). Cf. Callies v.
Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376, 381, 206 N.W. 198, 200 (1925) (action by parents for loss
of services of child injured negligently by a third party).
Wrongful death statutes generally provide that the personal representative of the
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tion is brought instead by the decedent's estate.'" In both shareholders'
derivative suits and survival actions, the claim originated in and belonged to
one party, who had a right to sue on it, but it then passed to the plaintiff who
ultimately brings the action.'"
Since a claim for loss of consortium never existed in the injured spouse in
the first instance, however, these situations are inapposite to loss of consortium
claims.'" Loss of consortium is a claim which the injured spouse could never
prosecute, assign, or destroy by settlement or judgment."' The injured spouse
never possessed the consortium spouse's right to receive the injured spouse's
society, affection, and services.'" Rather, the affection, companionship, serv-
ices, and the other items of consortium are personal rights of the consortium
spouse. 1 °9
Derivative, however, may not have this narrow meaning as it is used in
the consortium context. Rather, the term may have the broader meaning that
the consortium claim is directly dependent upon the marital relationship and
upon the other spouse's injuries. In other words, no consortium claim would
arise in the absence of the marital relationship and the injured spouse's in-
juries; accordingly, the consortium claim, for its existence, depends upon fac-
tors outside of the action by the consortium spouse against the negligent third
party. Hence, the consortium claim, being dependent upon these factors for its
existence, is seen as not being an independent cause of action. A cause of action
can be independent, however, even if it would not have occurred in the absence
of injuries to another or in the absence of a close familial relationship."° The
tort of infliction of severe emotional distress provides an example of such a
situation.
deceased may bring an action for the loss suffered as a result of the death on behalf of the benefi-
ciaries. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS 5 10-7-1 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. 55 15-51-10 and 15-51-20
(Law Co-op. 1977). See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 53, 5 23.8, at 1281 (wrongful
death statutes cover the loss to the beneficiaries from the death); PROSSER, supra note 11, 5 127,
at 902, 906. As with survival actions, wrongful death actions usually may be maintained only
where the deceased, had he lived, would have been able to maintain an action. See, e.g., R.I.
GEN. LAWS 5 10-7-1 (1969); tee also 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 11, 5 127, at 910. In wrongful
death actions, as in survival actions, the contributory negligence of the deceased limits the cause
of action and recovery of the beneficiaries. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 53, 5 23.8 at 1281.
W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, supra at 589. This limitation, however, is contrary to
what one might expect, because the wrongful death action is an independent cause of action.
This limiting rule "is at best an anomaly and an anachronism resulting from the unique
historical circumstances surrounding the development of a cause of action which was created en-
tirely by statute." Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 158, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 25 (1979). In-
deed, in California at least, the continued existence of the contributory negligence limitation in
wrongful death actions is questionable. Id. There is no basis for imputing the deceased's
negligence to the beneficiaries. 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 53, 5 23.8, at 1281.
104 See supra note 103.
"5 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 53, S 23.8, at 1278.
106 Id.
l° 7 Id.
'" See Id. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
'" Set Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 157, 157 Cal. Rptr., 22, 24 (1979).
110 See infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
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When one intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to
another by his extreme and outrageous conduct, he is liable to the other person
for such emotional distress and for any bodily harm resulting from it."' For ex-
ample, it has been suggested that such grounds for liability would exist where a
person attempts to commit suicide in another's home by slitting his throat,
knowing that there is a high degree of probability that the other person will
return home and find him.'" The other person must, of course, find him and
suffer severe emotional distress for the tort to be complete."s In this situation,
the claim for severe emotional distress would not have arisen but for the in-
juries to the one attempting suicide."'" The fact that the injuries were the
underlying "cause" of the severe emotional distress does not render this tort
action any less independent. The cause of action gives to the individual suffer-
ing the severe emotional distress a personal right to recover for injuries that he,
not the one attempting suicide, suffered as a result of the occurrence. Likewise,
the cause of action for loss of consortium belongs to the consortium spouse. It is
not made any less independent simply because it arises as a result of the injured
spouse's personal injuries. Rather, the injured spouse's injuries are one of the
circumstances giving rise to the consortium spouse's independent cause of ac-
tion. In actions for the negligent infliction of severe emotional distress, the cause
of action typically arises when a parent witnesses his child being injured or
perceives such injuries shortly after they have been inflicted. " 5 Again, in such
cases the parent's cause of action would not arise absent the injuries to his
child." 6 Yet, despite the "dependence" of the claim upon the injuries to the
child, the parent nonetheless has an independent cause of action."' In consor-
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 46 (1965).
" 2 Id. Comment i, illustration 16.
"s Id.
11+ The cause of action for intentional or reckless infliction of severe emotional distress
does not necessarily arise from any close relationship between the plaintiff and the injured per-
son, and to this extent it is somewhat distinguishable from the loss of consortium action. Actions
for intentional or reckless infliction of severe emotional distress are used here, however, only to
show that a cause of action can be independent even though it arises from injuries to another per-
son. Moreover, in actions for negligent infliction of severe emotional distress, the independent
cause of action typically arises as a result of injuries to another person and is generally "depend-
ent" on a close family relationship for its existence. See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
Actions for negligent infliction of severe emotional distress are therefore more closely analogous
to actions for loss of consortium than are actions for intentional or reckless infliction of severe
emotional distress.
"3 See, e.g. , Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 731, 441 P.2d 912, 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 74
(1968); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 557, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1296 (1978); Corso v.
Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 649-50, 406 A.2d 300, 302 (1979); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 150-51,
404 A.2d 672, 674 (1979).
", A close relationship between the plaintiff and the injured person is a key factor in
determining whether a cause of action for negligent infliction of mental distress exists. See infra
notes 118-22 and accompanying text. The cause of action for negligent infliction of severe emo-
tional distress is therefore analogous to the consortium action with respect to both the existence of
a close relationship and the existence of injuries to the closely related individual.
" 7 See, e.g. , Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 733-48, 441 P.2d 912, 916-25, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72, 76-85 (1968); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 568-69, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302
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tium cases, the consortium spouse likewise should have an independent cause
of action, despite the fact that the consortium claim arises from injuries to the
other spouse.
Actions for severe emotional distress also provide support for the view that
the consortium claim is no less independent simply because it arises from the
marital relationship. Indeed, some courts consider one of the critical factors in
determining whether a cause of action for the negligent infliction of severe emo-
tional distress exists to be whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely
related.'" A plaintiff who is closely related to the one suffering injuries is more
likely to suffer severe emotional distress from observing these injuries. 19 Also,
the defendant is more likely to foresee that a closely related person will suffer
severe emotional distress than to foresee that a stranger will do so."° The
requirement that the plaintiff be closely related to the injured person in order to
bring an action for negligent infliction of severe emotional distress, however,
does not negate the fact that the cause of action is independent."' Indeed, the
independent cause of action exists in part because of the close relationship be-
tween the injured person and the plaintiff.' 22 Similarly, in the case of consorti-
um actions the consortium claim exists because of the close relationship of the
consortium spouse and the injured spouse. Nevertheless, as with actions for
negligent infliction of severe emotional distress, the consortium claim should be
recognized as an independent cause of action.'" Although a spouse's cause of
(1978); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 659, 406 A.2d 300, 308 (1979); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa.
146, 172-74, 404 A.2d 672, 686 (1979).
" 13 See, e,g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 741, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80
(1968); D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., Inc., 326 A.2d 129, 131 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973) (in-
corporating the language of Dillon); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 568, 380 N.E.2d
1295, 1302 (1978); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 653-54, 406 A.2d 300, 304 (1979).
" 9 Dillon v. Legg, 68 Ca1.2d 728, 741, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968). ,
120 Id., 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
121 See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 733-48, 441 P.2d 912, 916-25, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72,
76-85 (.1968); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 567-69, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1301-03
(1978); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 651-59, 406 A.2d 300, 303-08 (1979).
122 See supra notes 118 and 121 and accompanying text.
'" The imputed negligence theory and the assignment theory, like the derivative
theory, inaccurately assess the nature of the consortium action. See supra notes 22 and 30. Under
the imputed negligence theory, the injured spouse's negligence is attributed to the consortium
spouse as a result of the marriage relationship. See supra note 22. Although this theory may have
been viable under the early common law view that the husband and wife were one legal entity, see
Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 155, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 23 (1979), it has largely lost its
persuasiveness in modern times. A principle of negligence law is that negligence is only imputed
to a plaintiff if his relationship to the negligent party is of such a nature as to make the plaintiff
liable for that person's negligence where it causes injury to a third person. 1 HARPER & JAMES,
supra note 53, $ 8.9 at 640. The husband, however, does not control the wife, particularly in the
sense that he should be legally responsible for her actions. The common law notion that the wife
was inferior to the husband has been repudiated; the husband and the wife now stand on equal
footing, both legally and factually. See Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 45, 49, 101 •
N.W.2d 227, 233, 235 (1960). The negligence of one spouse should not be attributed to the other
spouse, any more than it should be attributed to an unrelated individual. See PROSSER, supra note
11, 74, at 490. Moreover, Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Honey, 63 F. 39 (8th Cir. 1894), a
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action for loss of consortium "arises" from the marital relationship and from
the personal injuries to the other spouse, the harm suffered by the consortium
spouse is personal to that spouse. 124 Loss of consortium suffered by one spouse
impairs interests which are "wholly separate and distinct" from those which
are impaired by the personal injuries suffered by the other spouse.' 25
To the extent that derivative is used in the consortium context to suggest
the existence of only one claim for both the personal injuries of one spouse and
the loss of consortium of the other spouse, the term is misused. Furthermore,
even if derivative means simply that the consortium action is dependent upon a
marital relationship and personal injuries of the injured spouse, such factual
circumstances do not necessarily vitiate the independent legal status of the
claim."6 Indeed, policy considerations favoring and encouraging the marital
relationship suggest that a spouse should not be penalized, in effect, for a loss
suffered as a result of attempting to maintain that relationship when the other
spouse is injured.'"
2. Fairness Theory
The derivative theory proposes that the consortium spouse's recovery of
damages should be limited or barred by the injured spouse's negligence
because of the nature of the consortium action itself. 128 In contrast, the fairness
theory suggests that the consortium spouse's recovery of damages for loss of
consortium should be limited or barred by the injured spouse's negligence be-
cause it is not fair to require a negligent third party to pay all of the damages
leading case supporting the imputed negligence theory, was explicitly disapproved in Handeland
v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574, 576 (Iowa 1974).
In a more modern formulation of the imputed negligence theory, the Louisiana Court
of Appeals determined that where the injured spouse was on a "community mission" at the time
of the accident causing the injuries, that spouse's negligence would be imputed to the other
spouse to deny recovery in a consortium action, at least where the injured spouse's negligence
proximately caused the accident. Walker v. Milton, 253 So.2d 566, 568 (La. Ct. App. 1971),
aff'd on other grounds, 263 La. 555, 268 So.2d 654 (1972). It is not clear, however, what the court of
appeals meant by "community mission." To the extent that the theory imputes negligence from
one spouse to another, the preceding criticisms apply.
The assignment theory suggests that there is only one cause of action, which belongs
to the injured spouse, and that the part of his cause of action which is for loss of services to the
consortium spouse is assigned to the consortium spouse by operation of law. See supra note 30.
Since the assignment theory rests on the assumption that there is a sole cause of action for both
the consortium claim and the personal injury claim, the theory is an inaccurate assessment of the
nature of the consortium action. The consortium claim never existed in the injured spouse in the
first place. 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 53, 23.8, at 1278. It is a claim which the injured
spouse could never assign, because there was never anything to assign. See id. The consortium
claim is personal to the consortium spouse and only that spouse can sue for the elements of con-
sortium. See Lopez v. Waldrum Estate, 249 Ark. 558, 564, 460 S.W.2d 61, 65 (1970).
14 Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 157, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24 (1979).
125 Id.
126 See supra notes 110-23 and accompanying text.
' 27 See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
126
 See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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where the injured spouse's negligence contributed to some of the damage. 129
The most fundamental flaw in the fairness argument is its failure to consider
the injustice inherent in denying an independent right of recovery to the con-
sortium spouse. The question of fairness can be rephrased in terms of fairness
to this spouse."° A fundamental principle of negligence law is that one whose
negligence has caused damage to another should be liable for the damage."'
Thus, it would be a violation of this principle to allow a third party whose
negligence has caused or contributed to the consortium spouse's loss to avoid
some or all liability because of the conduct oithe injured spouse.'" Another
fundamental principle is that one whose negligence has contributed to his own
injury should not be permitted to place the burden of liability on another.' 33
This principle is violated where the consortium spouse, who is free from
fault,'" must suffer, in effect, a penalty in the form of reduced or no recovery
because of the negligence of the injured spouse.' 35 The injured spouse's negli-
gence should not be attributed to the consortium spouse.'"
In the consortium context, the appropriate comparison is between the
relative merits of the respective positions of the consortium spouse and the
third party, not between the merits of the positions of the injured spouse and
the third party. The faultless consortium spouse has suffered a very real and
personal loss. In contrast, the negligent third party, responsible for at least
some of the loss suffered by the consortium spouse, may have to bear more
than his share of the damages payment. While it is not entirely fair to require
the third party to bear the whole burden of payment, it is even less fair to allow
the consortium spouse to remain uncompensated. Under these principles, it
would be a worse evil to allow the negligent third party to escape liability than
to permit a contributorily negligent injured spouse to profit indirectly from his
own wrong.'"
The Supreme Court of Oregon in Ross v. Cuthbertm indicated that the
logical consistency suggested by viewing consortium claims as independent is
"highly desirable," but that the traditional rule is more in line with justice.'"
129 See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
"° See Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 1980).
' 3 ' Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 159, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 25 (1979).
132 Id., 157 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26.
"6 Id., 157 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
14 The consortium spouse's own contributory negligence would have an effect on that
spouse's action. In jurisdictions adhering to the contributory negligence doctrine, the consortium
action could not be maintained. Likewise, in comparative negligence jurisdictions, the consor-
tium spouse's recovery would be reduced by the proportion of that spouse's negligence. See supra
note 17.
y es Lantis v. Condon, 95 Ca/. App.3d 152, 159, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 26 (1979).
16 See PROSSER, supra note 11, S 74, at 490.
"7 Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 160, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 26 (1979).
"6 239 Or. 429, 397 P.2d 529 (1964).
'36 See id. at 434-35, 397 P.2d at 531. The Ross court noted that it was abiding by the
"settled" rule. Id. at 435-36, 397 P.2d at 532. The settled rule notion is essentially an indication
that the courts have followed this precedent for such a long time that it has gained the status of a
March 1983]	 LOSS OF CONSORTIUM	 423
If it is conceded, however, that the claim for loss of consortium logically is a
separate and distinct claim, then the fairness argument may be turned in favor
of allowing the consortium spouse full recovery for the loss suffered. For exam-
ple, some courts have held that while the contributory negligence of the injured
spouse bars the other spouse from maintaining a consortium action, it does not
affect the latter's action for property damages. ' 4° If consortium is viewed as a
separate and distinct right,' 4 ' however, it hardly seems logical or fair to allow
recovery for property damage but not for loss of consortium.'"
The various justifications advanced in support of the traditional view that
the injured spouse's negligence should limit or bar th.e consortium spouse's
recovery of damages actually may be manifestations of fairness concerns in
relation to the negligent third party. These concerns may reflect a determina-
tion by the courts that it is not fair for a third party to pay all the damages in an
action for loss of consortium when the negligent injured spouse was responsible
for some of them.'" Similarly, the courts may have concluded that it is not fair
to allow a family to "team up" against a third party and allow the consortium
spouse to recover in that spouse's name while the negligent spouse could not
recover.' 44 These considerations, however, overlook the competing concern of
fairness to the consortium spouse.' 45 A faultless consortium spouse should not
have his recovery reduced or barred in order to protect a blameworthy party. 146
These competing concerns, however, need not be mutually exclusive. Indeed,
the potential unfairness to both parties largely can be eliminated by granting
the consortium spouse full recovery and allowing the negligent third party to
obtain contribution from the negligent injured spouse.'"
C. Contribution and Loss of Consortium Actions
A major concern in consortium actions is to avoid placing an unfair
burden on a third party who is not completely responsible for all of the consor-
justification in itself. See supra note 33. This response does not, however, answer the criticisms put
forth in opposition to the rule. Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 440, 397 P.2d 529, 533 (1964)
(O'Connell, J., dissenting). It is a reflection of unquestioning reliance upon "settled" principles.
By issuing this response, the court has not met its responsibility as an appellate court to "recog-
nize only those principles of law that can be supported by sound reason." Id. (O'Connell, J., dis-
senting).
' 4° See, e.g., Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489, 496-97, 65 N.W.2d 917, 922 (1954);
Deskins v. Woodward, 483 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Okla. 1971).
14 ' See supra notes 48-82 and accompanying text.
'" Macon v. Seaward Constr, Co., Inc., 555 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1977); Ross v. Cuth-
bert, 239 Or. 429, 440-41, 397 P.2d 529, 534 (1964) (O'Connell, J., dissenting): "The majority
opinion does not attempt to explain this glaring inconsistency." Id. The settled rule is possibly a
reflection of disfavor with consortium actions and is tantamount to judicial legislation. See Id. at
441, 397 P.2d at 534.
' 4' See Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 435, 397 P.2d 529, 531 (1964).
' 44 Id., 397 P.2d at 531-32.
1" See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
147
 See infra notes 148-72 and accompanying text.
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tium spouse's damage. A related concern, however, is to avoid precluding or
reducing the consortium spouse's recovery when that spouse has not been con-
tributorily negligent. In the past it seems that these two concerns were viewed
as polar extremes. Yet, these apparently competing concerns need not be
polarized; both of the concerns can be satisfied by permitting contribution 148
among all negligent parties, including the injured spouse. Moreover, awarding
the consortium spouse full recovery and allowing contribution among the joint
tortfeasors maintains the logical consistency achieved by granting the consor-
tium spouse complete, independent recovery for a personal loss suffered by
him.
At least two courts faced with the problem of meeting the supposedly con-
flicting fairness concerns have suggested a contribution-type method for- solv-
ing the problem. In a jurisdiction adhering to the comparative negligence doc-
trine, the California Court of Appeals in Lantis v. Condon' 49 pointed out that in-
demnity could be sought by the negligent third party from the negligent injured
spouse.' 50
 Similarly, in a jurisdiction following the contributory negligence
doctrine, the Supreme Court of Iowa, in Fuller v. Buhrow,' 5 ' noted that the
negligent third party possibly could obtain contribution from the negligent in-
' 4° Contribution is a method of diStributing a plaintiff's loss among the tortfeasors whose
negligence contributed to the loss. See PROSSER, supra note 11, S 51, at 310. See also Knell v.
Feltman, 174 F.2d 662, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The underlying principle of contribution is that
when a tort is committed by the concurrent negligence of two or more persons, contribution
should be enforced. Contribution applies in such a case because it is deemed unfair to let one
bear the whole burden when two or more persons are responsible for the damage caused. See
PROSSER, supra note 11, 5 50, at 307; Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21
CORNELL L.Q. 552, 568 (1936). Contribution essentially requires each wrongdoer to pay his ap-
propriate share of the damages. See PROSSER, supra note 11, S 51, at 310. In some jurisdictions
the apportionment of liability effected by contribution is determined by dividing the damages
among the number of tortfeasors. See, e.g. , Early Settlers Ins. Co. v. Schweid, 221 A.2d 920, 923
(D.C. 1966). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 886A(2), comment h (1979). In other
jurisdictions, however, the distribution of liability by contribution is in proportion to the com-
parative fault of each defendant. See, e.g., Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, 6, 114 N.W.2d 105,
107 (1962); Mitchell v. Branch, 45 Hawaii 128, 141-42, 363 P.2d 969, 978 (1961). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 886A, comment h (1979).
149 95 Cal. App,3d 152, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1979).
us See id. at 159, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 26. The California Court of Appeal used somewhat
different terminology. It noted that a defendant could cross-complain against the contributory
negligent spouse for indemnity. Id. (emphasis added). The Lantis court also noted that the injured
spouse's liability should be discharged from his separate property before community property
could be reached. Id.
Indemnity, unlike contribution, shifts the entire loss from one tortfeasor who has paid
all of the damages to another tortfeasor who should be required to pay instead. See PROSSER,
supra note 11, S 51, at 310. The California Supreme Court has modified the indemnity rule in
California, however, to permit a concurrent tortfeasor to obtain partial indemnity from other
concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior
Court, 20 Ca1.3d 578, 598, 578 P.2d 899, 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 195 (1978). This partial in-
demnity doctrine produces results similar to those produced by contribution. See id. at 598-601,
578 P.2d at 912-13, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195-97. See supra note 141. Indeed, the Lantis court relied
upon American Motorcycle Association in reaching its conclusion as to cross-complaining for indem-
nity. See Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 159, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 26 (1979).
'" 292 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1980).
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jured spouse. 152 Although a system based upon comparative fault is ripe for the
utilization of contribution among joint tortfeasors, the contribution solution
need not be limited to comparative negligence jurisdictions.'"
Permitting full recovery to the consortium spouse and allowing the third
party tortfeasor to seek contribution from the negligent injured spouse also is
consistent with the view that the cause of action is independent. Contribution
frtim the negligent injured spouse would be available in an action by the other
spotise for physical injuries.I 54 For example, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co. v. Westlake,'" the New York Court of Appeals noted that where the wife, a
passenger in an automobile driven by her contributorily negligent husband,
sustained physical injuries in a collision between the automobile driven by her
husband and the automobile driven negligently by a third party, it was proper
for the non-spouse defendant to seek contribution from the negligent spouse in
the wife's suit for damages.' 56 Viewing the consortium claim as an equally in-
dependent cause of action,'" contribution 'should be available in this situation
as wel1. 138 Thus, the logical consistency achieved by permitting the consortium
spouse complete recovery for an independent, personal loss suffered by him
does not have to be sacrificed to achieve an arguably "fair" result.
Logical consistency with the view that loss of consortium is an independ-
ent cause of action is not, however, the only result achieved by permitting con-
tribution in the consortium context. As a result of requiring the injured spouse
to contribute to the consortium spouse's recovery, rather than requiring the
consortium spouse's award to be limited to the same extent that the injured
spouse's recovery would be limited, the position of the. consortium spouse is
improved in a number of ways. For instance, in a contributory negligence
jurisdiction, even though a contributorily negligent injured spouse's recovery
"2 See id. at 676.
'" A simple method for apportioning liability in a contributory negligence doctrine
jurisdiction would be to divide the damages among the number of tortfeasors. See supra note 148.
While this method may not be as fair as a method requiring pro rata apportionment of liability, it
obviates the necessity of assigning percentages of fault in a jurisdiction adhering to contributory
negligence doctrine. Also, it is certainly more equitable than requiring one party to pay all the
damages.
"4 See State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Westlake, 35 N.Y.2d 587, 590-91,
324 N.E.2d 137, 138-39, 364 N.Y.S.2d 482, 484-85 (1974). Contribution may not be available,
however, if interspousal immunity exists in a given jurisdiction. See infra notes 173-79 and accom-
panying text.
'" 35 N.Y.2d 587, 324 N.E.2d 137, 364 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1974).
"6 Id. at 590-91, 324 N.E.2d at 138-39, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85. The availability of
contribution depended, however, upon the absence of interspousal immunity in New York. Id. at
591, 324 N. E.2d at 139, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
"7 See supra notes 48-82 and accompanying text.
Ise
	
interspousal immunity exists, however, contribution may not be available. See
infra notes 173-79 and accompanying text. Requiring contribution among all joint tortfeasors also
is consistent with comparative fault principles, where they are applicable, in that both negligent
persons whose concurring negligence contributed to the consortium spouse's injury would share
the burden of payment of damages. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 828-29, 532 P.2d
1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975).
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may be barred, the consortium spouse would still be granted full recovery for
his loss.' 59
 Likewise, in comparative negligence jurisdictions, the recovery of
the consortium spouse would not be limited in any way by the injured spouse's
negligence.'" Furthermore, to the extent that the injured spouse is insured, the
consortium spouse would receive independent compensation; there is not sim-
ply a shuffling of funds from one spouse to the other.' 6 '
A possible objection to the usefulness of contribution in the consortium
context, however, is that if the injured spouse is uninsured, aside from paper
shuffling, the overall result would be the same as that achieved under the tradi-
tional view that requires the consortium spouse's maintenance of an action or
recovery of damages to be limited or barred by the injured spouse's negligence.
For example, in a comparative negligence jurisdiction, reducing the consor-
tium spouse's recovery by the percentage of the injured spouse's negligence
arguably accomplishes the same result as allowing the consortium spouse full
recovery and then requiring the injured spouse to pay his share of the damage
award. This objection assumes, however, that the consortium spouse's award
will become part of the "family treasury."'" To avoid this problem, the judg-
ment paid by the negligent spouse should be taken from the spouse's separate
property,'" to the extent that such separate property is recognized in a given
jurisdiction.'" Likewise, the award received by the consortium spouse should
become the consortium spouse's separate property.'"
Even if a jurisdiction fails to recognize separate property, contribution
should still be allowed because it amounts to more than mere paper shuffling
where the negligent spouse is insured' 66
 and instances where the negligent
159
 See supra note 14 and accompanying text and note 17.
' 66 See supra note 14 and accompanying text and note 17.
161
 Persons carry insurance to cover losses and liabilities. If the negligent injured spouse
had caused a loss to an outside party, the insurance money would appropriately be used to com-
pensate the loss. The consortium spouse, as a separate individual, should likewise be compen-
sated. The marriage relationship should not be a basis for denying receipt of the insurance pro-
ceeds.
162 Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 1980).
'" Indeed, the California Court of Appeal has pointed out that the injured spouse's
liability should be discharged from that spouse's separate property before community property
could be reached. Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 159, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 26 (1979).
' 64 This separate property remedy may not be widely available, however, because many
jurisdictions fail to recognize separate property in relation to proceeds received by a spouse in a
tort action. Seel. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY SS 14:1-14:9, at 225-37 (1973); A. CASNER, 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 5 7.16 (1952 & Supp. 1960).
16 ' Requiring the injured spouse to pay the consortium spouse's judgment from his
separate property and requiring this damages payment to become the separate property of the
consortium spouse conceivably could lead to marital disharmony. This argument, however, is
highly speculative. It is by no means certain that such a requirement would result in marital
disharmony. Indeed, it is likely that discord between the spouses over separate property will not
arise unless they decide to obtain a divorce, and by that point the disruption of the marital har-
mony already would have occurred. Moreover, the instances in which the injured spouse will be
uninsured are likely to be limited, so this concern is not a major one. See infra note 167 and ac-
companying text.
166 See rupra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
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spouse is not insured are likely to be rare, especially in automobile accident
situations, and consortium claims typically arise in such situations.' 67
 Indeed,
the results achieved under the traditional approach and the contribution ap-
proach are similar only where the injured spouse is uninsured. Even in this
situation the results arguably are not the same because under the contribution
approach the faultless consortium spouse is obtaining full recovery and the
negligent injured spouse is required to contribute to the consortium spouse's
award, whereas under the traditional approach, the faultless consortium
spouse is denied some or all recovery whenever the injured spouse is negligent.
In the loss of consortium context, the focus should be on the consortium
spouse's rights, not upon the internal dynamics of the family unit as such.
The reason that the contribution approach produces a result similar to
that produced under the traditional approach in this limited situation is
because the injured spouse is uninsured, not because of any impact of the in-
jured spouse's negligence on the consortium spouse's action or recovery. The
contribution approach is consistent with the view that the consortium spouse
has an independent cause of action and therefore should be granted full
recovery despite the injured spouse's negligence. Disregarding the contribution
approach to recovery for loss of consortium because it tends to produce a result
similar to that produced by the traditional approach in a limited situation is in-
appropriate. Such disregard overlooks the overall benefit obtained by the con-
sortium spouse under the contribution approach. Additionally, rejecting the
contribution approach for this limited reason overlooks the independent nature
of the consortium spouse's claim. Therefore, in order to maintain consistency,
contribution should apply in a given situation whether the negligent spouse is
insured or not.'" Contribution is an appropriate method for apportioning
liability where joint tortfeasors are involved. 169
 Its use should not be denied
simply because, in a limited context, it might lead to a result similar to that
achieved under the traditional rule requiring the consortium spouse's recovery
to be reduced according to the amount of the injured spouse's negligence.
There is a possibility, of course, that the injured spouse might be judg-
ment proof. The injured spouse, therefore, will not be able to contribute his
167 See, e.g., Macon v. Seaward Constr. Co., Inc., 555 F.2d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 1977) (hus-
band's car and defendant's truck collided); Hamm v. City of Milton, 358 So.2d 121, 122 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (automobile driven by wife collided with city truck; husband sued for loss of
services); Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489, 491, 65 N.W.2d 917, 919 (1954) (action for injuries
and damages arising out of an automobile accident); Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 430-31, 397
P.2d 529, 529-30 (1964) (pickup truck driven by husband struck from the rear by automobile
driven by defendant; wife sued for loss of consortium).
169 Where the injured spouse is insured, the insurance proceeds could be required to
become part of the consortium spouse's property as in the situation where the injured spouse is
uninsured. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. Disruption of the marital harmony in
this context is much less likely than in cases where the injured spouse is uninsured because the
consortium spouse's judgment is being paid by an insurance company; the payment is not com-
ing directly from the injured spouse's own assets.
169 See supra note 148.
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share of the payment of the consortium spouse's judgment. In such circum-
stances, the negligent third party may be required to pay the entire amount of
damages to the consortium spouse."° This requirement places an additional
burden on the negligent third party, but equity sometimes requires that the
share of an insolvent tortfeasor be borne by the other tortfeasors."'
Essentially, fairness to all parties is achieved by permitting contribution
and by requiring the consortium award, where possible, to become the sepa-
rate property of the consortium spouse. A portion of the damages recovered by
the consortium spouse where contribution is alloWed comes from the negligent
injured spouse. It is not as though the injured spouse is escaping liability and
the third party is bearing the full burden. The negligent injured spouse is ac-
tually having his own recovery reduced in his action for personal injuries and .
also is paying part of the damages awarded to the other spouse. The negligent
third party, on the other hand, is required to pay only his appropriate share of
the judgment. Furthermore, the faultless consortium spouse is allowed to
recover in full. The potential unfairness of excessive damages awards is not a
major concern because the courts generally have the ability to find such awards
excessive and to require them to be reduced accordingly.'" To the extent that
courts espousing the derivative rationale and other arguments in favor of the
settled rule do so because of underlying fairness concerns, perhaps this con-
tribution solution will lead to a reassessment of the validity of such rationales.
Courts may be more willing to determine that loss of consortium is actually an
independent cause of action.
1. Interspousal Immunity and Contribution in Consortium Actions
The success of contribution as a means for dealing with the consortium
recovery problem may, however, be largely a function of whether a given
jurisdiction has abolished interspousal immunity."s The interspousal immuni-
170 See PROSSER, supra note 11, $ 50, at 310. A principle of tort law is that where the
negligences of two or more parties combine to produce a single, indivisible injury, the tortfeasors
are jointly and severally liable for the whole damage. See Arnst v. Estes, 136 Me. 272, 275, 8
A.2d 201, 203 (1939).
71 See PROSSER, supra note 11, $ 50, at 310. These equity concerns are particularly per-
tinent where the plaintiff is free from fault.
1" See, e.g., Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 364, 299 S.W.2d 41,
48-49 (1957); Hodges v. Johnson, 417 S.W.2d 675, 693 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
"3 See, e.g. , Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 1980) (abrogation of inter-
spousal immunity doctrine removes impediments to obtaining. contribution from negligent
spouse in consortium claims); Feltch v, General Rental Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189, 1196,
421 N.E.2d 67, 72 (1981) (loss of consortium is one area in which interspousal immunity still ap-
plies and thus contribution cannot be obtained from the negligent spouse).
While providing an in-depth analysis of the arguments for and against the interspous-
al immunity doctrine is beyond the scope of this note, this note reviews the various arguments
and examines their relative merits. Interspousal immunity is discussed here because it might pre-
vent contribution in consortium actions in jurisdictions where the doctrine exists in that context.
Accordingly, it is urged that interspousal immunity be abolished in relation to loss of consortium
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ty doctrine prevents one spouse from bringing a tort action against the other
spouse. t74
 Accordingly, since liability does not exist between the spouses,
arguably, there can be no joint liability between a spouse and a third person.'"
Although it is possible to require contribution from one spouse in a suit against
a third party by the other spouse even where interspousal immunity exists, 16
interspousal immunity may preclude contribution in such a case,'" especially
since the right of contribution arises from a joint liability."s Contribution from
the injured spouse, therefore, may not be available in loss of consortium ac-
tions. "9
Until recently, interspousal immunity was the prevailing rule in most
states.'" Today, however, the interspousal immunity doctrine has been aban-
doned or curtailed by a majority of jurisdictions.'" Various arguments have
been propounded in favor of interspousal immunity. The original justification
for the doctrine was based upon the historical notion of the unity of a husband
and wife.'" Aside from this early justification, four major reasons have been
actions, at least insofar as contribution is concerned. See generally, Annot., 92 A.L.R. 3d 901
(1979 & Supp. 1982).
"4 See Yellow Cab Co: v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
1 " See id.
16 See, e.g., Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 221, 110 A.2d 175, 177 (1975) (a tortfeasor
has a right to contribution against a joint tortfeasor even though the plaintiff is precluded from
enforcing liability against the joint tortfeasor because the latter is the plaintiff's wife); Zarrella v.
Miller, 100 R.I. 545, 547, 217 A.2d 673, 675 (a spouse, though immune from suit by the other
spouse, is a joint tortfeasor and therefore liable for purposes of contribution). See also Renfrow v.
Gojohn, 600 S.W.2d 77, 79, 81-82 Appendix C (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
'" See Feltch v. General Rental Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189, 1196, 421 N.E.2d 67,
72 (1981); Renfrow v. Gojohn, 600 S.W.2d 77, 79, 81 Appendix C (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
'" See Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
"9 See, e.g., Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 1980) (abrogation of inter-
spousal immunity doctrine removes impediments to obtaining contribution from negligent
spouse in consortium claims); Feltch v. General Rental Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189, 1196,
421 N.E.2d 67, 72 (1981) (loss of consortium is one area in which interspousal immunity still ap-
plies and thus contribution cannot be obtained from the negligent spouse).
' 8° See Self v. Self, 58 Cal.2d 683, 684-86, 376 P.2d 65, 66, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97, 98 (1962);
Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 623, 351 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1976).
191 See MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 73 n.3 (Me. 1980) (the majority of ju-
risdictions in ever increasing numbers have rejected the doctrine of interspousal immunity);
Renfrow v. Gojohn, 600 S.W.2d 77, 78, 80-81 Appendices A and B (1980) (the interspousal
immunity doctrine has been completely abolished in a majority of states and partially abrogated
in several other states). See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629-30, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532
(1976) (interspousal tort immunity no longer a bar to action by one spouse against another for
injuries arising out of an automobile accident); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373, 173
N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969) (the absolute defense of interspousal immunity in actions for tort is ab-
rogated); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977) (interspousal tort immunity abol-
ished to the extent that it would bar claims for willful or intentional torts). Freehe v. Freehe, 81
Wash.2d 183, 192, 500 P.2d 771, 777 (1972) (the rule of interspousal disability in personal injury
cases is abandoned). See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 901 (1979 & Supp. 1982).
182 See Self v. Self, 58 Ca1.2d 683, 684, 376 P.2d 65, 65-66, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97, 97-98
(1962); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 72-73 (Me. 1980); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass.
619, 620-21, 351 N.E.2d 526, 527-28 (1976); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 185-86, 500
P.2d 771, 773-74 (1972).
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advanced in support of the continued application of the interspousal immunity
doctrine. First, the destruction of peace and tranquility in the home likely to
result from allowing one spouse to sue another in tort has been suggested as a
justification for the immunity.'" Second, the argument has been made that the
interspousal immunity rule prevents fraud or collusion where one or both
spouses carry liability insurance.'" Third, the contention has been advanced
that abrogation of interspousal immunity would flood the courts with trivial,
burdensome matrimonial disputes.'" Finally, it has been suggested that any
change in the status of the interspousal immunity doctrine should be made by
legislatures, not courts.'"
in abrogating or restricting interspousal immunity, courts have con-
sidered the various arguments proposed in favor of the doctrine. For example,
the early notion of the legal unity of husband and wife has been recognized as
no longer a valid concept. ' 87 Husband and wife are regarded as separate in-
dividuals in modern society. 188 Therefore, courts have determined that the con-
cept of the legal unity of husband and wife is no longer a satisfactory basis for a
rule of interspousal tort immunity.' 89
The argument that the family peace and tranquility would be destroyed by
allowing one spouse to sue another also has been rejected."° One court has
suggested that if a state of peace exists in the home, then either no action will be
commenced, or the spouses will allow the action to continue only so long as
their domestic harmony is not jeopardized."' Moreover, the same court noted
that if domestic peace and tranquility is nonexistent or tenuous before the claim
' 83 See Klein v. Klein, 58 Ca1.2d 692, 694, 376 P.2d 70,.72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104
(1962); . MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 73 (Me. 1980); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass.
619, 623-24, 351 N.E.2d 526, 529 (1976); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 187, 500 P,2d 771,
774 (1972).
184 See Klein v. Klein, 58 Ca1.2d 692, 694, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104
(1962); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 73 (Me. 1980); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass.
619, 623-24, 351 N.E.2d 526, 529 (1976); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 188, 500 P.2d 771,
775 (1972).
183 See Klein v. Klein, 58 Ca1.2d 692, 694, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104
(1962); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 188, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972).
186 Set MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 73-75 (Me. 1980); Lewis v. Lewis, 370
Mass. 619, 624-28, 351 N.E.2d 526, 531-32 (1976); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 189, 500
P.2d 771, 775-76 (1972).
187 See MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 72-73 (Me. 1980); Lewis v. Lewis, 370
Mass. 619, 621-22, 351 N.E.2d 526, 527-28 (1976); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 186-87,
500 P.2d 771, 773-74 (1972).
188 See MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 72-73 (Me. 1980); Lewis v. Lewis, 370
Mass. 619, 622, 351 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1976); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 186-87, 500
P.2d 771, 774 (1972).
188 See, e.g. , cases cited supra at note 188.
I" See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Ca1.2d 692, 694, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104
(1962); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 73 (Me. 1980); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass.
619, 624, 351 N.E.2d 526, 529 (1976); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 187, 500 P.2d 771,
774 (1972).
181 See, Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 187, 500 P.2d 771, 774 (1972).
March 1983]
	 LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
	 431
arises, disallowing a law suit is more likely to create unrest, rather than har-
mony. 192
The contention that abrogating interspousal immunity will lead to fraud
or collusion where one or both spouses carry liability insurance likewise has
been rejected by the courts. 193  This argument, it has been noted, assumes that
courts and juries cannot distinguish fraudulent claims from legitimate ones. 194
This notion has been criticized on the grounds that the general ethics and
honor of the citizenry and the abilities of judges and jurors to distinguish
spurious claims from valid ones can serve as safeguards in respect to the fraud
problem. ' 95
 Courts have recognized that spouses should not be denied a cause
of action simply because the possibility of fraud exists.'" Moreover, one court
suggested that if the judicial processes are inadequate safeguards against fraud,
then the legislature should deal with the problem.' 97
With regard to the argument that permitting litigation between spouses
would inundate the courts with a burdensome amount of trivial matrimonial
disputes, courts have recognized that no such inundation has occurred in states
which have abolished interspousal immunity.'" This argument has been con-
sidered unsound insofar as it rests upon the mere possibility of such trivial
lawsuits.' 99
 Accordingly, courts have determined that this contention provides
insufficient support for the continued maintenance of the interspousal immuni-
ty rule. 20°
Finally, courts typically have rejected the argument that abrogation of in-
terspousal immunity is a matter for legislative action only. 20 ' In rejecting this
contention, courts have recognized that interspousal immunity is a common
law doctrine, not a legislative rule. 202
 Accordingly, these courts have deter-
mined that judicial abrogation of the doctrine is appropriate.'"
197 See id.
195 See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Ca1.2d 692, 694-96, 376 P.2d 70, 72-73, 26 Cal. Rptr.
102, 104-05 (1962); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 73 (Me. 1980); Lewis v. Lewis,
370 Mass. 619, 624, 351 N.E.2d 526, 529 (1976); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 188-89,
500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972).
194 See Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 188-89, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972).
195 See MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 73 (Me. 1980); Freehe v. Freehe, 81
Wash.2d 183 ; 189, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972).
196 See, e.g., cases cited supra at note 195.
' 97 See Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 189, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972).
198 See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Ca1.2d 692, 694, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104
(1962); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 188, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972).
199 See Klein v. Klein, 58 Ca1.2d 692, 694, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104
(1962); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 188, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972).
700 See, e.g., cases cited supra at note 199.
20 ' See, e.g., MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 73-75 (Me. 1980); Lewis v.
Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 627-29, 351'N.E.2d 526, 531-32 (1976); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d
183, 189, 500 P.2d 771, 775-76 (1972).
2" See, e.g., MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 73-74 (Me. 1980); Lewis v.
Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 627-29, 351 N.E.2d 526, 531-32 (1976); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d
183, 189, 500 P.2d 771, 773 (1972).
203 See, e.g., MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 73-74 (Me. 1980); Lewis v.
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In support of the abolition of the interspousal immunity doctrine, courts
have indicated that a fundamental principle in the law of torts is that absent a
statute or compelling reasons of public policy, a person wrongfully injured by
another should be compensated for the harm suffered.'" Similarly, strong
policy considerations favoring immunity are necessary to justify a judicially
created immunity for tortfeasors. 205 Since the reasons advanced in support of
the interspousal immunity rule have been determined to be inadequate to
justify the rule,'" the requisite compelling policy concerns supporting the rule
are absent. Accordingly, a majority of jurisdictions have abolished the in-
terspousal immunity doctrine. 207
The reasons advanced by the courts in support of abrogation of inter-
spousal immunity provide sound justification for abandoning the rule. This
note, therefore, urges that the interspousal immunity doctrine be abolished in
jurisdictions retaining it208 in the context of loss of consortium actions. The
doctrine should be abrogated to the extent that it exists as an impediment to
contribution from the negligent injured spouse in loss of consortium actions. If
a jurisdiction is unwilling to abolish interspousal immunity completely, partial
abrogation of the rule is possible.'" Indeed, limited abrogation of the doctrine
has taken place in some jurisdictions with respect to automobile accidents. 21 °
Actions for loss of consortium frequently arise in this setting. 21' Total or partial
abrogation of interspousal immunity would remove the impediment to gaining
contribution from the negligent injured spouse. 212 It would thus make available
a valuable method for dealing with the fairness concerns, discussed pre-
viously, 213 while at the same time achieving a logically consistent result.
In theory, if interspousal immunity is abolished, the consortium spouse
should be able to sue the injured spouse directly. This result is appropriate if a •
Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 627-30, 351 N.E.2d 526, 531-32 (1976); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d
183, 189-92, 500 P.2d 771, 775-77 (1972).
"4 See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 CaI.2d 692, 694-95, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102,
104 (1962); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532 (1976).
"' See Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532 (1976).
"6 See supra notes 180-96 and accompanying text.
207 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
208 Only a minority of jurisdictions still retain the interspousal immunity doctrine. See
supra note 181 and accompanying text.
209 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. See also infra note 210 and accompanying
text.
2" See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629-30, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532 (1976);
Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 404, 528 P.2d 1013, 1017 (1974); Digby v. Digby, 388 A.2d 1, 4
(R.I. 1978); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 106, 300 A.2d 637, 641 (1973).
21I
	 e.g., Macon v. Seaward Constr. Co., Inc., 555 F.2d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 1977) (hus-
band's car and defendant's truck collided); Hamm v. City of Milton, 358 So.2d 121, 122 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (automobile driven by wife collided with city truck; husband sued for loss of
services); Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489, 491, 65 N.W.2d 917, 919 (1954) (action for injuries
and damages arising out of an automobile accident); Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 430-31, 397
P.2d 529, 529-30 (1964) (pickup truck driven by husband struck from the rear by automobile
driven by defendant; wife sued for loss of consortium).
212 See Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 1980).
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third party also is involved; the grounds for an action for loss of consortium are
largely predicated on wrongdoing by a third person." There must be a limit
imposed, however, where the consortium spouse attempts to sue the injured
spouse who was one hundred percent negligent. First, such an action is not
contemplated within the nature of the consortium action because the consor-
tium action assumes the existence of a third party tortfeasor." Second, such
an action should not be allowed as a matter of policy, since it would open the
door to potentially collusive or frivolous claims. If it were allowed, one spouse
could sue another who negligently fell from a roof or who planned such an in-
jury with the other spouse. These sorts of suits do not arise in situations which
the consortium action seeks to remedy." For these reasons, the ability of the
consortium spouse to recover from the injured spouse should be limited to cases
where a third party tortfeasor also is involved. With this limitation upon the
consortium action, contribution can be an effective method for achieving just
results where joint tortfeasors are involved.
CONCLUSION
The traditional rule for consortium actions requires the consortium
spouse's recovery of damages for loss of consortium to be limited or barred to
the same extent that the injured spouse's recovery of damages in his action for
personal injuries would be limited or barred. One of the main theories
espoused in support of this rule suggests that the consortium action is deriva-
tive, or otherwise dependent upon the injured spouse's right to recover
damages for his own personal injuries. Additionally, the traditional rule has
been regarded as achieving fair results in relation to the negligent third party
because it relieves him from bearing the whole burden of compensating the
consortium spouse.
Some modern courts have rejected the traditional rule, however, and have
held that the negligence of the injured spouse has no effect on the consortium
2" See supra notes 31-37 and 130-46 and accompanying text..
2• See Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 167-68, 302 N.E.2d 555, 564 (1973) (a
claim for loss of consortium arises "from personal injury of the other spouse caused by negligence
of a third person . . . "); Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. 1978) ("either spouse
has a cause of action for loss of consortium that might arise as a result of an injury caused to the
other spouse by a third party tortfeasor's negligence").
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
2" That is, the consortium action is based upon involvement of a negligent third party.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text. This does not have to mean that the negligent spouse
cannot be held liable to the consortium spouse as well, as long as a nonspouse is also a defendant.
See Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App.3d 152, 159, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 26 (1979) (indirectly by
allowing a third party to receive indemnification from negligent injured spouse); Fuller v.
Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 1980). Rather, the suggestion here is that at least one of the
persons liable to the plaintiff/consortium spouse must be a negligent third party. This require-
ment helps to eliminate collusive or frivolous suits since there is a definite outside wrong commit-
ted against the consortium spouse. Also, fairness is achieved by allowing the negligent spouse to
contribute to the payment of damages, since both that spouse and the negligent third party con-
tributed to the consortium spouse's loss.
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spouse's recovery of damages. These courts hold that the consortium claim is
independent of and distinct from the injured spouse's claim; the consortium
claim is not derivative. This note submits that this is the preferred view. More-
over, these courts indicate that the greater fairness concern suggests that the
faultless consortium spouse should not have his recovery reduced or denied so
that a negligent party can be relieved of liability.
At any rate, fairness concerns pertaining to both the negligent third party
and the consortium spouse can be quieted by allowing the third party to seek
contribution from the negligent spouse. By permitting contribution, the
consortium spouse can obtain recovery in full, and the negligent third party
will bear only his share of the damages. The success of contribution in the con-
sortium context depends largely, however, upon the status of interspousal im-
munity in a given jurisdiction. It is urged that this immunity be abolished in
jurisdictions that have not yet done so, at least to the extent that the doctrine
prevents contribution in consortium actions. Permitting contribution is consis-
tent with the view of consortium as an independent cause of action; it also
achieves fairness to all concerned. Moreover, the availability of contribution in
consortium actions may lead to a reassessment of the traditional rule by those
courts that still adhere to it.
DOUGLAS G. VERGE
